Russia Steps Up Energy Blackmail in Europe

Russia Steps Up Energy Blackmail in Europe

The Kremlin never limits itself to one set of instruments to reach its aims. Russia mixes conventional means, such as military confrontation and economic interdependence, with non-conventional tools. For instance, attempts to influence electoral outcomes in European countries or assassinations carried out abroad.

After the 2014 occupation of Crimea, many foreign observers proclaimed that Russian foreign policy was hybrid. It is a false perception based on little interest in the region before the Revolution of Dignity. Since Putin arrived at the Kremlin, Russian foreign policy has been marked by a blatant disregard for international norms, and it was not easy to see this behaviour as rational.

Take, for example, attacks against Russian energy infrastructure. At first glance, it is irrational for the Kremlin to bite the hand which feeds them. Yet, regarding energy blackmail, Putin has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice short-term gains to induce pain in the opponent. 

Georgian Business

In 2005, the Kremlin was negotiating a gas pipeline deal with Georgia. Under it, Moscow would regain the ownership of the pipeline via Georgia to Armenia and thus control the flow of Iran gas to Europe. Tbilisi was first willing to swap the pipeline for debt clearance but baulked at the last moment. 

Moscow chose a coercive strategy, trying to push Georgia back into cooperation. In January 2006, two explosions happened in Russia-controlled North Ossetia, damaging a pipeline which transferred Russian gas to Georgia. Georgia was highly dependent on Russian gas: in 2005, the Georgians consumed 1.45 billion cubic meters, having imported 1.44 billion cubic meters from Russia.

So when the gas stopped flowing, Georgia was left without heating in the middle of the winter. Russia blamed Chechen fighters for the “accident”. Caucasus expert Pavel Baev notes that explosions in the region have never targeted strategic infrastructure since 1995. To make the matter even more suspicious, one more attack occurred a few hours after the gas pipeline explosion. The third explosion destroyed a high-voltage transmission line in the Russia-controlled Karachay-Cherkessia region, hindering Russian electricity exports to Georgia. Sounds familiar yet?

Submarine Troubles

For the past 30 years, Russia has been freeriding liberal international order which enables three freedoms of movement: people, capital and goods. This regime of trade enabled Russia to expand its gas pipeline arsenal dramatically. The Yamal-Europe pipeline was built in 1997, connecting Russia with Germany via Belarus and Poland. Another pipeline running to Germany through Central and Eastern Europe was Brotherhood, constructed in the Soviet times.

However, the Kremlin wanted to wipe Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Czechia from the chain. As long as these states control the pipelines, they have a leverage point to resist Russian pressures. It is how Moscow built two Nord Streams that go directly from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. 

On the 26th of September, 2022, explosions damaged both pipes of Nord Stream 1 and one pipe of Nord Stream 2. Since September these routes were not used to transport gas to Europe. In other words, the Kremlin did not have much to lose there. 

Despite the similar Georgian experience, many observers felt uneasy about Russia damaging its pipelines. Rushed conspiracy theories proclaimed that the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces might be behind the attacks. Others pointed at the USA. The Kremlin could not be happier. Putin went on to allege that Poland is complicit too.

Despite the widespread belief, economic interests do not always shape international relations. Indeed, Ukraine and Poland receive payments for the transit of Russian gas and, therefore, would profit from the destruction of Nord Streams. But should the investigation find evidence pointing at Poles or Ukrainians, this would completely undo Euroatlantic integration for these two states. Allies to the west are crucial for the survival of both states so that no decision-maker would risk for a more significant profit margin. 

And after all, Nord Streams were destroyed. One pipe of Nord Stream 2 is theoretically operational. On the 22nd of February, chancellor Olaf Scholz halted the certification of this pipeline. Thus, the Russian message to Germany is clear: should you have a gas shortage, you would need to excuse yourself for your behaviour.

Derailed

While Swedish investigators were looking into sabotage in the sea, German officials onshore were also busy. On the 8th of October, two cables were cut, first in the Rheinland metropolitan area and then in Berlin. Without them, the location of trains throughout Northern Germany could not be tracked. The railway operators were forced to cancel most of the traffic in the region. 

The investigators did not publicize their findings as of yet. Police officials suppose the perpetrators could be either local extremists or Kremlin agents. However, it is remarkable that the sabotagers made their first venture near the German-Dutch border. Major railways run from the Netherlands east cross through the Rheinland metropolitan area. The Netherlands supplies arms to Ukraine, although it keeps details discrete. It may as well be the case that the Kremlin did not only aim to stir turbulence in Germany but hinder arms shipment from the Netherlands.

Oil Incident 

It is not only the gas pipeline which runs through Poland. The northern section of the Druzhba oil pipeline also finds its way to Germany through this country. On the 12th of October, a leakage in one of its two pipes was detected. The second pipe works properly. 

The preliminary investigation results do not support a sabotage version. Accidents do happen. For instance, in 1986, there was a leak in the now-defunct Latvian section of the pipeline. The same happened in 1995 in Ukraine. The latest such leakage occurred in 2015 in Belarus. 

However, it is suspicious that the third accident of this sort targeting Germany happened within three weeks. Russia may try to make Berlin believe that the Polish populist government purposefully shattered the deliveries while the Polish-German relations are strained. The ruling Justice and Order party stirs up anti-German sentiment in Polish society, calling for WWII reparations that have been off the table for a long time. At the same time, Poles have a valid reason to resent German Russophilic tendencies, which enabled the full-scale invasion.

Target Audience

Time and again, the Kremlin weaponizes energy and runs covert operations on foreign soil. The reasons and purpose are clear. Russian forces will not win the Russo-Ukrainian War on the battlefield; therefore, Russia attempts to undo European support to Ukraine. The key to their strategy lies in Berlin, Russians believe.