Myths of Neo-Nazism and Bandera: How Azov Became the Target of Russian Propaganda

One of the Russians' versions of the reason for the military invasion of Ukraine was the destruction of the "Nazis" and "Banderites". The Azov Brigade was particularly affected by the spread of such propaganda. 

Since 2014, Russia has propagated the narrative labelling the Azov Brigade as ‘neo-Nazi,’ a claim that gained traction both in Ukraine and internationally. This disinformation allowed Russia to justify bans on military aid to the Azov Brigade, prohibit their participation in exercises, and later use the same narrative against the entire Ukrainian army.

This myth mixed the concepts of nationalism, a popular ideology in Azov and based on the works of Mikhnovskyi, Stsiborskyi and Dontsov. The Russians distorted everything: the organisational structure of the unit, its ideology and symbols. 

Svidomi interviewed Vladyslav Dutchak, call sign "Dotsent," Azov Brigade Lieutenant, historian and PhD in Philosophy, to discuss how Russia constructed and disseminated the myth of ‘neo-Nazism’ within Azov, what repercussions it had, and how the Brigade resisted this propaganda.

Russian propaganda became particularly active following the first attempts to occupy Ukraine in 2014. In May-June of that year, the then-volunteer Azov Regiment played a crucial role in preventing Russian forces from capturing Mariupol. Since then, Azov has been one of the primary targets of Russian disinformation, with accusations of "neo-Nazism" within its ranks being a central theme.

The Russians chose the label «neo-Nazism» for a specific reason. For decades, Russians have referred to Ukrainians as «brotherly» people, and they cannot openly claim that they are fighting against the Ukrainian population. As a result, Russian propaganda aims to frame Ukrainians as «Nazis» in the minds of the average Russian. This portrayal, in turn, justifies the war as a continuation of the "cause" fought by their ancestors during World War II.

This perspective is explained by Vladyslav «Dotsent» Dutchak, a Ukrainian professor and historian who was one of the founders of the «Khorunzha School» within Azov in 2017. Dutchak, a lieutenant in the Azov Brigade, was taken prisoner by Russian forces at the Azovstal plant during the blockade of Mariupol in the spring of 2022 and was released in September of the same year.

According to Dutchak, the Russians focused on three main components of the Azov Battalion to support their claim of «neo-Nazism»: its organizational structure, ideology, and symbols.

The Russian approach to disinformation has remained consistent over the years. «If you add something new or remove something old, it will only harm the paradigm established by the Russians,» explains Vladyslav «Dotsent» Dutchak.

Since 2014, Russian rhetoric has continued to use the terms «battalion» and «regiment,» even though Azov has long since become a brigade. Russian propagandists still refer to the Azov Brigade as a «Nazi battalion,» even though, at the start of its existence, it was a «volunteer battalion,» like many similar units.

The Russians also continue to describe Azov as a paramilitary formation or a «militia» that operates independently, although the 12th Azov Brigade is a fully integrated unit of the National Guard of Ukraine.

«When I was released from captivity and watched a Russian-made film about me called The Recruiter, I learned that Zelenskyy himself was supposedly afraid of me. Allegedly, I influenced Ukrainian politicians and threatened them to fight to the end, even as a junior sergeant in the blockaded Mariupol at the time. It’s futile to look for logic in the Russian portrayal,» shares Dutchak.

Russian propaganda has repeatedly claimed that Azov’s ideology is rooted in racism and fascism. The absurdity of these accusations becomes clear when considering the diversity within Azov’s ranks: soldiers of various nationalities serve in the unit, including Kartvelians (Georgians), Belarusians, Tatars, Crimean Tatars (Qırımlı), Hungarians, Jews, Greeks, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians. Combatants of all nationalities and religions have been part of Azov’s ranks. Despite this diversity, Azov has been accused of Nazism, anti-Semitism, ultranationalism, and numerous other «isms» that are often fundamentally incompatible with each other.

«Indeed, in its early stages, Azov was formed by volunteers from the nationalist environment who brought with them a nationalist worldview and ideology. Over time, however, this has evolved, and now we can speak more about the brigade’s corporate military culture, which has spiritual ties to the military culture and ideology of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the 20th century,» explains Vladyslav «Dotsent» Dutchak.

Regarding Stepan Bandera, Azov soldiers regard him as a Hero of Ukraine and a symbol of the struggle for Ukrainian independence, according to Dutchak. However, Dutchak himself is more drawn to figures like Konovalets and Shukhevych.

Today, the composition of the Azov Brigade is too diverse to claim that it follows a singular ideology in the classical sense. The Brigade is developing its own ideology, based on ideas relevant to the modern Ukrainian state.

«The only ideology our professional army can have is the defense of Ukrainian statehood. Protection of territorial integrity and independence. Protection of the interests of the Ukrainian nation. The role of the Azovs in this modern period can be compared to the role of the Sich Riflemen in the Ukrainian People’s Republic Army: ‘...a national legion in the service of a legitimate, popularly recognized national government, regardless of the nature of the state system and the socio-political legislation implemented by that government.’ For us, the nation is a timeless community of the ‘dead, the living, and the unborn.’ For us, the nation is a great family. And the family needs to be protected and cherished,» Dutchak elaborates. He continues: «The unit’s soldiers emphasize this mission during award ceremonies with the words: ‘I serve the Ukrainian nation!’ Our ideology is most concentrated in our rituals, such as the Prayer of the Ukrainian Nationalist and the Decalogue.»

In this context, it is important to distinguish clearly between nationalism and Nazism. Nationalism is based on the idea of a mono-national state that benefits its people. Nazism, on the other hand, seeks to establish a mono-ethnic society based on the pseudoscientific ideas of eugenics, which promote the artificial selection of certain ethnic groups or races to "improve the human race."

The symbol of Azov is ꑭ, representing the «Idea of the Nation.» This symbol has been used by various organizations, including Patriot of Ukraine, Fraikor, Azov, the Third Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and many others. Russians claim that this symbol is identical to the Wolfsangel, a symbol used by the Third Reich. However, such accusations are based solely on the external similarity between the two symbols, despite their entirely different meanings. The Wolfsangel itself has been used in German heraldry for centuries.

According to Vladyslav «Dotsent» Dutchak, the accusation is absurd, especially considering that the Russians themselves use the letter «Z,» which was also used by the Third Reich army. Many of the symbols the Russians displayed on their military equipment at the beginning of the full-scale invasion were previously associated with the Wehrmacht.

Russian propaganda also had an impact on the Azov servicemen themselves. While the effect was small, it was noticeable.

«Russian propaganda had a negative influence. We had quite a few people join our unit who could speak English fluently. There were loud accusations from outlets like The Telegraph, The New York Times, The Guardian, and others. It was quite offensive. You read these articles and are left with one question: 'How can this be?' You wonder, is it paid for, is it an unconscious position, or something else?», «Dotsent shares.

This issue can be divided into three groups: those who support these myths due to internal political struggles; those who are on the Russian payroll or driven by personal profit and branding; and «useful idiots,» as «Dotsent» refers to them.

«We’re used to interpreting all statements in Western media or from Western politicians as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ us. We need to understand that there are also political party games at play. Discrediting our unit and the entire Armed Forces is often more about discrediting an opponent who supports Ukraine. For example, the rivalry between Republicans and the left wing of the Democratic Party. Azov is just a tool here.»

Notably, the Leahy Law, which requires incidents of human rights violations to be assessed based on specific facts, was never applied to Azov. This decision stemmed largely from the characterization of Azov by Western media, which had evidently been influenced by Moscow’s propaganda.

John Conyers Jr., a member of the Democratic Party, was the first American politician to raise the issue of Azov's alleged «neo-Nazism.» In 2016, he introduced a bill to stop U.S. aid to Azov. While Conyers is often labeled pro-Russian in Ukrainian media, «Dotsent» clarifies that he wasn’t; he was simply an extreme left-wing figure who based his conclusions on false premises and was opposing the Trump administration, which at that time supported Ukraine.

This discrediting campaign in Western media only gained more momentum. Azov’s situation worsened as the left wing of the Democratic Party opposed President Trump. By 2017, the Western press was openly accusing the U.S. of «supporting neo-Nazis in Ukraine.»

Former FBI official Ali Soufan joined the political campaign in 2017, alleging that «17,000 international right-wing mercenaries from 50 countries» had come to fight in Ukraine. He also claimed that right-wing radicals would come to power in Ukraine by 2019, according to Vladyslav Dutchak.

In 2018, left-wing Democratic congressman Ro Khanna, who was popular in Russian media, led a movement of more than 50 congressmen advocating for the cessation of military aid to Ukraine that Trump had unblocked.

By 2019, New York Congressman Max Rose initiated an appeal signed by 40 members of the U.S. House of Representatives demanding that the Azov Regiment be designated a terrorist organization. The congressmen displayed their ignorance of the issue, stating that «the Azov battalion is a well-known ultranationalist militia organization in Ukraine that openly invites neo-Nazis into its ranks.» Fortunately, the State Department did not support this appeal, but the Brigade still did not receive weapons.

These politicians and media outlets continuously referred to the "Azov Battalion" in their statements. As a result, this campaign led to a ban on providing Western weapons to the Brigade and a ban on involving them in training and exercises with U.S. and NATO instructors.

Some individuals genuinely believe and spread such narratives in the West. "Dotsent" explains that, unlike Russians, Europeans base their conclusions on logic and facts. However, the problem arises from distorted basic facts. As a result, Europeans and Americans often use false premises to draw conclusions.

The latter group benefits directly from spreading such information—financially from the Russians and by increasing their own popularity. «Dotsent» points to Simon Shuster, a senior correspondent for TIME Magazine, who spread fake news about Azov’s ties to right-wing radicals in the West in 2021 while writing a book about Volodymyr Zelenskyy called The Showman.

Ukraine has also seen its share of detractors, or «useful idiots,» as "Dotsent" refers to them. These include pro-Russian politicians and left-wing activists such as Volodymyr Chemerys and Taras Bilous (the latter likely having changed his views, as he now serves in the Armed Forces), who organized actions calling for the «Disband Azov!» campaign. Pro-Russian left-wing organizations, such as the Stalinist group Borotba, also consistently conducted an information campaign against Azov.

This Russian rhetoric was also supported by some historians, whom "Dotsent" calls «unscrupulous.» One such example is Marta Havryshko, a «war crimes researcher,» who distorts Azov's ideology, accuses it of Nazism, and makes numerous errors regarding the Brigade’s organizational structure. From references to a «chaplaincy service» that does not exist in Azov to confusion over the Brigade's officer and sergeant ranks, "Dotsent" points out that these inaccuracies reveal the true intent behind the narrative. «If you pay attention to these small details, it immediately becomes clear which way the wind is blowing,» he explains.

Today, Russian propaganda is adapting its narratives for the Ukrainian public. According to Dutchak, they claim that Azov acts as a «barrier» preventing mobilized Ukrainians from retreating or surrendering. «This is how they explain why they failed to take Kyiv in three days.» These narratives are being pushed by Russia to create divisions within Ukrainian society.

Since its inception, Azov has faced the consequences of Russian disinformation. According to Associate Professor Vladyslav «Dotsent» Dutchak, Brigade Commander Denys «Redis» Prokopenko invited Western journalists to stay at Azov’s bases with the personnel, to observe, listen, and search for any signs of «neo-Nazism» within the unit. The command has always been open to scrutiny, but not everyone writing about Azov was willing to come and see for themselves.

Both domestic and international Azov initiatives, supported by Ukraine's military and political leadership, have been carried out systematically over the years, leading to a change in the world’s perception of the Brigade. One of the first successes came in April 2022 when Japan removed Azov from its list of terrorist organizations and issued an apology.

In 2022, the American company Meta Platforms removed Azov from the list of blocked organizations, allowing the Brigade to have verified accounts on Facebook and Instagram. Rallies in support of Azov's captured fighters, as well as memorial rallies for the victims of the Olenivka terrorist attack, gathered large crowds in various U.S. cities. These rallies were attended not only by members of the Ukrainian community but also by Americans with no direct ties to Ukraine and diverse political views.

In July 2023, Francis Fukuyama, a renowned American philosopher and author of The End of History and the Last Man, met with Azov representatives at Stanford University and expressed support for the Brigade on Twitter (X). "Dotsent" notes that this had a significant impact on American intellectuals and helped present Azov in a new light.

In 2023 and 2024, Azov representatives visited the U.S. and met with members of both the Democratic and Republican parties. In 2024, Azov spoke at the UN and Davos (Ilia «Gandalf» Samoilenko), at the Council of Europe (Serhii «Molfar» Tsisaruk), and met with NATO representatives while participating in international military conferences.

International volunteers who joined the Brigade also played a role in dispelling the myth of Azov's «neo-Nazism.» More information on this can be found in the video «A US Marine on the International Legion, the Ukrainian Army and Service in Azov» on Vladyslav Dutchak’s YouTube channel, Dotsent Knows.

Another significant success in combating Russian propaganda has been the blocking of Russian media outlets like Russia Today and Sputnik in Europe.

«The information environment shapes the consciousness of voters. In democratic societies, politicians rely on voters. Accordingly, with the blocking of Russian media, narratives are changing,» "Dotsent" explains.

The culmination of this struggle came in June 2024 when the ban on the transfer of American weapons to Azov was lifted. Azov passed the inspection required by U.S. law, conducted by the State Department under the Leahy Act. The inspection found no evidence of gross human rights violations by the Brigade.

«Mariupol changed everything,» Dotsent says. The Azov Brigade became legendary not only in Ukraine but also internationally for its heroic exploits alongside other units in the blockaded Mariupol, the «City of Mary».